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Re gional Fac tor of the De vel op ment of the Ukrai nian’s Po lit i cal Cul ture
OLEKSANDR STEGNIY,
Doc tor of Sci ences in So ci ol ogy, Lead ing Re search Fel low of the
De part ment of Socio-Po lit i cal Pro cesses, In sti tute of So ci ol ogy, NAS of
Ukraine
Re gional Fac tor of the De vel op ment 
of the Ukrai nians’ Po lit i cal Cul ture1
Ab stract
The au thor ex am ines the re gional fac tor’s in flu ence on in te gra tive and
ac ti vat ing func tions of po lit i cal cul ture of the pop u la tion of Ukraine. As
a fac tor of in flu ence on the above-men tioned func tions, the re gion is
treated as a ter ri to rial or ga ni za tion of socio-po lit i cal and socio-cul tural
as pects of a com mu nity’s ac tiv ity. The con gru ence of com mon socio-cul -
tural val ues, as well as the level of po lit i cal sol i dar ity is re searched on
the ba sis of his tor i cal iden tity, spa tial-ter ri to rial self-iden ti fi ca tion, a
de sir able line of the re gional de vel op ment re lated to the op po si tion “na -
tion ally in te grated — re gion ally au ton o mous”, as well as the de gree of
au thor i tar i an ism in a ter ri to rial com mu nity. Em pir i cal data al low con -
clud ing about po lit i cal cul ture of all re gions of Ukraine that can be de -
fined as tend ing to the in te gra tive-pas sive type with slight dif fer ences.
Re gional As pects in the New est His tory of Ukraine
In so cio log i cal books, a re gion is re garded mostly as a space of a cer -
tain so cial cul ture, power or ga ni za tion, and cul tural tra di tions; this al -
lows talk ing about a ter ri tori ally dif fer en ti ated com mu nity of peo ple. Ac -
cord ing to the so cio log i cal ap proach, the ter ri to rial or ga ni za tion is an
ag gre ga tion of ter ri to rial com mu ni ties of var i ous lev els and in ter re la -
tions [1, p. 6; 2, p. 178–179]. Re gional dis tinc tions are stud ied along
with the ac tiv ity of ter ri to rial com mu ni ties. In so cio log i cal anal y sis of so -
88 Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2004–2005
1
Trans lated from the Ukrai nian text “Regional’nyi faktor rozvytku politychnoii kul’tury naselennia
Ukrainy”, Sotsiolohiia: teoriia, metody, marketynh, 2005, ¹ 3, pp. 94–122.
cial and ter ri to rial struc ture of so ci ety, re search ers con cen trate their at -
ten tion on the so cial mech a nism of func tion ing and de vel op ment of so -
cial and ter ri to rial com mu ni ties. 
Ac cord ing to the data of so cio log i cal polls1, for most Ukrai ni ans, the
term re gion has two mean ings: the place where they live and the part of
Ukraine, which dif fers from an oblast by its his tory, eco nom ics, cul ture,
and size. 
At the be gin ning of 1990s, there were se ri ous dis cus sions on fed eral
struc ture of the state. A con vinc ing ar gu ment was that ev ery his tor i cal
re gion of Ukraine has its spe cific eth nic, socio-eco nomic, cul tural, and
lan guage char ac ter is tics. In the opin ion of pro po nents of fed eral struc -
ture, the be long ing to the uni fied Ukrai nian na tion does not deny this
kind of so cial or der; on the con trary, to save and strengthen the na tion,
there should be granted more au ton o mous rights tak ing into ac count lo -
cal dif fer ences of Ukrai nian re gions. 
Re gional elites wanted to strengthen their po si tions in Ukrai nian po -
lit i cal life, and this ac ti vated the re gional move ments in 1998–1999. At
that time, rep re sen ta tives of re gional elites tried to re al ize their goals
through var i ous po lit i cal par ties2 and pub lic or ga ni za tions, like Re gion
Re vival (Vidrodzhennia Regionu) in Odessa oblast, Un ion of the Ukrai -
nian Lo cal and Re gional Au thor i ties’ Lead ers (Spilka lideriv mistsevykh i
regional’nykh vlad Ukrainy), and the dep uty group Re gions’ Re vival
(Vidrodzhennia Regioniv) in the Verkhovna Rada. 
At pres ent, re gional move ment has as sumed an elit ist char ac ter, be -
cause lead ers of gov ern men tal or gans and some of the peo ple’s dep u ties
mostly laid its foun da tions. As a re sult, the re gional move ment is not
con sol i dated: de spite their com mon in ter ests (a grad ual de cen tral iza -
tion of power and trans fer of cer tain au thor i ties to the re gional level),
there are dis crep an cies be tween eco nomic in ter ests of dif fer ent re gional
and in ter re gional groups.
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The all-na tional poll, 1200 re spon dents, con ducted by the SOCIS Cen ter in 1997 and the all-na -
tional poll, 1800 re spon dents, con ducted by the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy of the NAS of Ukraine in
2004.
2
In No vem ber 2000, the con gress united Party of Re gional Re vival of Ukraine (Partiia Regio -
nal’noho Vidrodzhennia Ukrainy) with four other par ties and es tab lished Party of Re gional Re vival
“La bor Sol i dar ity of Ukraine” (Partiia Regional’noho Vidrodzhennia “Trudova Solidarnist’ Ukrainy”).
In March 2001, the spe cial con gress gave this party a new name — Party of Re gions (Partiia
Regioniv). In De cem ber 2001, it con sisted of 460 thou sand mem bers united in over than 8 thou -
sand party or ga ni za tions, in clud ing 7200 pri mary ones (see: http://www.polit.com.ua). 
Dur ing the pres i den tial elec tion of 2004, the fol low ing ques tion was
raised: what struc tural con fig u ra tion of the po lit i cal power had to be in
Ukraine?
For the first time in the new est his tory of our state, the sym bolic and
cul tural cap i tal of the West ern Ukraine’s elite, the so cial cap i tal of Ukrai -
nian es tab lish ment and a part of eco nomic cap i tal be long ing to the
power elite of the whole Ukraine could have been con cen trated in one
cen ter of in flu ence and in hand of the one po lit i cal group. 
The sit u a tion was prob lem atic, be cause it was the first time when the
elite from East ern Ukraine that, even in the so viet time, had ex erted the
eco nomic power and strongly in flu enced po lit i cal pro cesses on a na -
tional scale, could have lost those means of in flu ence at the level of pres i -
den tial power. East ern in dus trial and the cap i tal-cen tral elites did not
man age to fight down the op po site can di date V. Yuschenko and his po lit -
i cal group, which could have gained all main types of so cial cap i tal af ter
com ing to power (by P. Bourdieux).
The at tempt to pro claim the South east ern Ukrai nian Au ton o mous
Re pub lic was a so cial re flec tion of re gional elite in East ern Ukraine on
the lost bal ance be tween re gional and sec toral power groups, on the one
hand, and sources of po lit i cal in flu ence, on the other.
To com plete this brief his tor i cal de scrip tion of the re gion al ism phe -
nom e non in Ukraine, we would like to de fine its two main forms. The first 
one re lates to the eco nomic in ter ests of re gions and geo graph i cally co in -
cides with the cur rent ad min is tra tive di vi sion. This form is po ten tially
ca pa ble of be com ing the de ci sive fac tor of regionalization. How ever, now,
when it is too early to talk about the real bal ance be tween the na tional
and lo cal eco nomic in ter ests ad vanced at a re gional level, the de ter mi na -
tive is the sec ond form — his tor i cal and eth nic, which be ing ig nored,
causes an acute ten sion in the in ter nal po lit i cal sit u a tion. In this con -
text, so cial re search ers con sider four or six re gions (if the East is di vided
into the North-East, i.e. Slobozhanschyna, and Donbas, the Au ton o -
mous Re pub lic of Cri mea and South are re garded sep a rately as well). 
Re gional Dis tinc tions in Po lit i cal Cul ture
as a Sub ject Mat ter of So cio log i cal Re search
Ukrai nian so ci ol o gists pay much at ten tion to his tor i cally spe cific fea -
tures in flu enc ing the so cial de vel op ment of ter ri to rial com mu ni ties,
peo ple’s at ti tude to wards his tor i cal events in our coun try, na tional at -
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trib utes, as well as to the choice of its for eign pol icy di rec tions and stra -
te gic part ners [see: 3–10].
Ac cord ing to S. Makeyev, in Ukraine, re gional sub cul tures are “the
prod ucts of his tor i cal de vel op ment, type of set tle ment, ed u ca tional and
age struc tures of res i dents, their way of life, cus toms and tra di tions,
 interpretation of re al ity, as well as so cial and eco nomic con di tions” [9,
p. 8].
In the mid dle of 1990s, so cio log i cal re searches aimed at re veal ing re -
gional dis tinc tions in po lit i cal ori en ta tions of the res i dents of Lviv and
Donetsk led to the idea that the most sig nif i cant dif fer ences be tween the
res i dents of two cit ies are eth nic and po lit i cal, while so cial dif fer ences
are of mi nor im por tance [11, p. 108].
Dur ing 1994–1999, mon i tor ing on the dy nam ics of a per sonal
self-iden ti fi ca tion and form ing of iden ti fi ca tion mod els for rep re sen ta -
tives of three gen er a tions in Lviv and Donetsk re vealed the sig nif i cance
of lo cal iden ti ties for res i dents of both cit ies (Lvivite and Donetskite).
Rep re sen ta tives of dif fer ent gen er a tions in Lviv per son i fied the more
static so cial en vi ron ment, while in Donetsk it was more dy namic [12,
pp. 256–257].
Some na tional so ci ol o gists think that there is a po lit i cal ge og ra phy of
Ukraine con sti tuted by the elec tion of 19941, when L. Kuchma first
elected as the Pres i dent of Ukraine. It means that “his tor i cal, cul tural,
eco nomic, and set tle ment dif fer ences be came of po lit i cal kind and were
re duced to the means of strug gle for dom i na tion, while to ac cen tu ate
them is a rule of po lit i cal game” [13, p. 6].
So cial re search ers no tice that re gional dis tinc tions in a po lit i cal cul -
ture ex ist not only in the line East-West. For ex am ple, N. Pohorila says
about hor i zon tal (West-East) and ver ti cal (North-South) cul tural di vi sion 
of Ukraine. Re gard ing the po lit i cal cul ture as a com bi na tion of po lit i cal
com pe tence, trust in pol i ti cians, and po lit i cal ac tiv ity, N. Pohorila
stresses that the men tioned el e ments of po lit i cal cul ture are hardly re -
lated to the line West-East. More over, in her opin ion, op po si tion of po lit i -
cal cul tures like “civic-es tranged” is more char ac ter is tic of the Cen ter
and South [14, pp. 64, 78].
As to po lit i cal cul ture, politologists dif fer en ti ate three vec tors of in flu -
ence in Ukrai nian po lit i cal space: south west ern that de ter mines cul -
tural and re li gious pro cesses; south east ern that con trib utes to eco -
nomic de ci sions; south ern (in clud ing the Au ton o mous Re pub lic of Cri -
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In that year, there were held par lia men tary and early pres i den tial elec tions.
mea) that makes for sep a rat ist and au tono mist ten den cies in Ukrai nian
pol i tics [15]. Be sides, in pres ent-day Ukraine, there are three po lit i cal
sub cul tures — Rus sian, Ukrai nian, and west ern, dif fer ences be tween
which can be ex plained mostly by dif fer ent so cial and eco nomic ac tiv i -
ties, as well as at ti tude to the na tional in ter ests [16, pp. 142–143].
So, we can talk about seg men ta tion of Ukrai nian po lit i cal and cul -
tural space. Now the re gional com mu ni ties are char ac ter ized by a spe -
cific re gional con scious ness based on their re gional iden ti fi ca tion, re -
gional in ter ests and val ues, com mon his tor i cal and po lit i cal ex pe ri ence,
eth nic and con fes sional fea tures, pres ence of re gional “agents” form ing
a po lit i cal cul ture.
We can con clude that the pres ent-day Ukrai nian so ci ety has no con -
sen sus po lit i cal cul ture with the co in cided at ti tudes of cit i zens of the
whole coun try to cer tain po lit i cal forces stand ing for cor re spond ing
ideo log i cal val ues and po lit i cal vec tor of de vel op ment, to the for eign pol -
icy course, in par tic u lar, un der the ex pand ing glob al iza tion. 
On the con trary, there ex ist con flict po lit i cal cul tures in re gional mea -
sure ments. Our re search is aimed to re veal the im pact of such con flicts,
es pe cially com po nents of po lit i cal cul ture af fected over time. 
To re search a po lit i cal cul ture, we ap plied the func tional ap proach1.
The most im por tant func tions of po lit i cal cul ture are the fol low ing:
— Cog ni tive (in di ca tors: in ter est in pol i tics, po lit i cal knowl edge).
— Evaluative (as sess ment of po lit i cal sit u a tion, po lit i cal events and
ac tiv i ties of po lit i cal or ga ni za tions and lead ers).
— Orientational (at ti tude to ideo log i cal val ues and po lit i cal forces
stand ing for them).
— In te gra tive (trust in po lit i cal in sti tu tions and po lit i cal iden ti fi ca -
tion).
— Ac ti vat ing (elec toral pref er ences, po lit i cal par tic i pa tion, po lit i cal
com pe tence, readi ness to po lit i cal ac tions).
— Prog nos tic (hopes or fears re lated to po lit i cal pros pects).
The sub ject mat ter of our sur vey is a re gional in flu ence on the most
im por tant func tions of po lit i cal cul ture in ter ri to rial com mu ni ties of
Ukraine for the first de cade of Ukrai nian state in de pend ence. Tak ing
into ac count the mass so cial un rest in the end of 2004 (the Or ange Rev o -
lu tion) and pos si ble new sce nar ios of the socio-po lit i cal de vel op ment,
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1
Ye. Golovakha sug gested this ap proach within the frame work of the re search study Po lit i cal
Cul ture of the Ukrai nian So ci ety; Cur rent State and De vel op ing Trends, per formed by the De part -
ment of Socio-Po lit i cal Pro cesses, IS NASU.
the most es sen tial, among all the above-men tioned func tions of po lit i cal
cul ture, are the in te gra tive and ac ti vat ing ones. Com bin ing them, we can 
con struct the fol low ing types of po lit i cal cul ture: in te gra tive-ac ti vat ing,
in te gra tive-pas sive, disintegrative-ac ti vat ing, and disintegrative-pas sive. 
The typology can be ap plied to de ter mine the pros pects of civil so ci ety
in Ukraine (with a cer tain level of so cial self-or ga ni za tion) and pub lic
sup port of the so cial or der ac cord ing to the line “uni tary-au ton o mous”. 
As a fac tor of in flu ence on the above-men tioned func tions of po lit i cal
cul ture, a re gion will be con sid ered in terms of po lit i cal, so cial, and cul -
tural life of ter ri to rial com mu ni ties. Con gru ence of com mon socio-cul -
tural val ues and the level of po lit i cal sol i dar ity will be an a lyzed as to his -
tor i cal iden tity, spa tial-ter ri to rial self-iden ti fi ca tion, and de sir able lines
of re gional de vel op ment re lated to the op po si tion “na tional in te gra tion — 
re gional au ton omy” [more see: 4], as well as the de gree of au thor i tar i an -
ism in ter ri to rial com mu ni ties. 
We re vealed the re gional dis tinc tions in po lit i cal cul ture of Ukrai nian
pop u la tion us ing the data of the all-na tional polls con ducted within the
frame work of the mon i tor ing sur vey Ukrai nian So ci ety in 1994–2005, the 
sec ond wave of the all-na tional poll Po lit i cal Cul ture of the Pop u la tion of
Ukraine (No vem ber 1991)1, and the all-na tional poll of 1997 car ried out
within the so cio log i cal pro ject Re gions in Ukraine: The Dy nam ics, Move -
ments, and Pol i tics2.
The re gional fac tor’s in flu ence on po lit i cal cul ture is re garded in four
macro-re gions: the Cen ter, the West, the East, and the South. Such a di -
vi sion is ad vis able, be cause we can in crease the sam ple size for sta tis ti -
cal anal y sis. More over, the ter ri to ries of the men tioned macro-re gions
cor re spond to the geo graph ical dis tri bu tion of elec toral pref er ences dur -
ing par lia men tary and pres i den tial elec tions of the last de cade.
Ta ble 1 rep re sents the sam ple dis tri bu tion in macro-re gions. To see
quan ti ta tive dif fer ences, we put: 1 — for the mon i tor ing sur vey Ukrai -
nian So ci ety; 2 — for the sec ond wave of Po lit i cal Cul ture; 3 — for Re gions
Re gional Fac tor of the De vel op ment of the Ukrai nian’s Po lit i cal Cul ture
Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2004–2005 93
1
The poll was con ducted within the frame work of the in ter na tional pro gram on po lit i cal cul ture
stud ies of the pop u la tion in East ern Eu rope. The data were col lected by a stan dard ized in ter view.
Rep re sen ta tive sam ple in cluded 1752 re spon dents. 
2
The mat ter con cerns the pro ject car ried out by the International As so ci a tion for the Pro mo tion
of Co op er a tion with Sci en tists from the New In de pend ent States (NIS) of the For mer So viet Un ion
(INTAS) ¹ 94-3938. The data were col lected by a stan dard ized in ter view. Rep re sen ta tive sam ple
in cluded 1200 re spon dents. 
in Ukraine. Dif fer ences in the macro-re gional dis tri bu tion were caused
by dif fer ent sam ple de sign and size. 
In all ta bles, the data are pre sented ac cord ing to the num ber of an -
swers but not to the to tal num ber of re spon dents.
Ta ble 1
Dis tri bu tion of Sam ples as to the Macro-re gions of Ukraine
Macro-





Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Kyiv
(with the city of Kyiv), Poltava, Sumy,
Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv 
590 456 329
The West Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk,Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi 326 366 251




Odessa, Kherson, the Au ton o mous Re -
pub lic of Cri mea
482 649 326
Re gional Fac tor of the In te gra tive Func tion
Anal y sis of the re gional fac tor of in te gra tive func tion for po lit i cal cul -
ture is based on the def i ni tion of his tor i cal iden tity of ter ri to rial com mu -
ni ties, their spa tial-ter ri to rial self-iden ti fi ca tion and ori en ta tions to the
de sir able line of de vel op ment in the “uni tary-au ton o mous” di men sion.
The in te gra tive func tion in di ca tors are trust in po lit i cal in sti tu tions
( basic tri um vi rate, i.e. President–parliament–government) and political
iden tity.
Peo ple’s ap pre hen sion of the his tor i cal past pro duces their ori en ta -
tions to the fu ture and, as a re sult, tools for col lec tive ac tions and stra te -
gic po ten tial of a ter ri to rial com mu nity. Au thors of the joint mono graph
on for ma tion of re gions in post-so cial ist Eu rope un der stand his tory as a
“re pos i tory” or a “con tainer” for sym bols that can be for got ten, ac ti vated, 
re con structed, or pre sented in a new form for com mu ni ca tive in ter ac -
tion [17, v. 1, p. 33].
Ac cord ing to the all-na tional sur vey con ducted with the au thor’s par -
tic i pa tion [4], the ma jor ity of Ukrai nian cit i zens say that knowl edge of
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cul ture and his tory is im por tant for eth nic iden ti fi ca tion of a per son.
How ever, at ti tude to the his tor i cal events is of spe cific char ac ter. 
Af ter Ukraine had de clared in de pend ence, its his tory was re vised un -
der the slo gan Re stor ing His tor i cal Truth. There were pub lished new text -
books for sec ond ary schools. The his tory-mak ing fig ures, which had
been stig ma tized as “na tion al ists” and “trai tors” of Ukrai ni ans’ in ter ests 
in the so viet pe riod, got new eval u a tions that of ten were com pletely op -
po site. This fact makes anal y sis of at ti tude to wards events of Ukrai nian
his tory rather com pli cated. 
How ever, the at ti tude to the most im por tant events of the na tional his -
tory en ables, on the one hand, to re trace the his tor i cal mem ory; on the
other hand, to re veal how the eval u a tion of a his tor i cal event in flu ences
the cur rent po lit i cal ori en ta tions of re spon dents. 
His tor i cal mem ory, as a kind of so cial mem ory, in cludes peo ple’s ex -
pe ri ence and their eval u a tions of sig nif i cant events re flected in the pub -
lic re sponses to re al ity. “Sym bolic cap i tal” can be con sid ered as a “re pos -
i tory of knowl edge and sym bols”, which is pop u lar in the whole so ci ety or 
a so cial group. The col lected sym bolic re sources can be ma te ri al ized in
dis courses and col lec tive ac tions to wards var i ous signs, in the ap pre -
hen sion of cer tain his tor i cal events and pre sen ta tion of facts, concepts,
points of view, or theoretical constructions.
At the same time, we have to re mem ber that his tor i cal cog ni tion de -
pends on po lit i cal or ga ni za tion of so ci ety and try to pre vent the mytho -
logization of his tor i cal con scious ness. 
To un der stand how es ti ma tion of a prom i nent fig ure or his tor i cal
event makes for the con struc tion of so cial self-iden ti fi ca tion and mod -
ern imag ined com mu ni ties, we use the his tor i cal iden tity term tak ing
into ac count that it was formed due to the of fi cial in ter pre ta tion of his -
tory and an in di vid ual’s mem ory. His tor i cal iden tity to gether with mem -
ory en ables to get a per sonal pos i tive eval u a tion of his tory-mak ing fig -
ures or events re gard less of the time elapsed; it cor re sponds to the opin -
ions about his tor i cal events, which were molded from the knowl edge ac -
quired in sec ond ary schools and uni ver si ties, as well as due to the state -
ments of var i ous po lit i cal fig ures pre sented by the mass me dia [8, p. 27].
Con struc tion of his tor i cal iden tity is of se lec tive char ac ter, con trary
to of fi cial in ter pre ta tions of his tory where some facts or per sons of the
past are in cor po rated into the main stream and be come the ob jects of
rec og ni tion and ad mi ra tion, while oth ers are iso lated, ig nored, or de -
nied. The cri te ria for such a se lec tion are po lit i cal sit u a tion and val ues
cher ished by so cial, po lit i cal and eco nomic en vi ron ment. 
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Ger man culturologist Jorn Rusen sug gested a typology of his tor i cal
events ac cord ing to their mo dal ity in flu enc ing the his tor i cal iden tity for -
ma tion. These events are of pos i tive or neg a tive mo dal ity, as well as those
help ing to sub sti tute old con cepts of col lec tive iden tity for the new. More -
over, J. Rusen di vides his tor i cal events by their places in his tor i cal de vel -
op ment of col lec tive iden tity for any na tion into three kinds: events as
turn ing points, events that can cel the pre vi ous pat terns of col lec tive
iden tity, and events that re an i mate these pat terns [18].
All his tor i cal events are se lected to be tools cor re spond ing to the men -
tioned typology and can be chro no log i cally di vided into three cat e go ries. 
The first cat e gory in cludes events of the 17th cen tury, the pe riod when
Ukrai ni ans bravely fought against Pol ish en slave ment. 
The Pereyaslav Coun cil (Pereyaslavska Rada) in 1654 had le gally es -
tab lished a un ion of Ukraine and Rus sia; Ukrai ni ans ac cepted the un -
ion with the hope for pos ses sion of equal rights and help in the na tional
lib er a tion. How ever, these hopes did not come true be cause the first
sprouts of Ukrai nian state were cut off by Rus sia. This is a cru cial point
be cause pro po nents of the USSR’s re vival stress the good will of Ukrai ni -
ans in 1654 with out tell ing the real rea son for Ukraine to es tab lish this
un ion [19; 20]. 
The sec ond cat e gory is the pe riod of So viet power start ing with the Oc -
to ber Rev o lu tion of 1917 or the Oc to ber up heaval, as some his to ri ans
call it. 
The third cat e gory in cludes the new est events, from the col lapse of
the USSR and dec la ra tion of the state in de pend ence of Ukraine.
To cal cu late the in dex of his tor i cal event eval u a tion, we em ployed a
three-point or di nal scale where one point means the neg a tive at ti tude,
two points — the in dif fer ent, three points — the pos i tive. 
One can see the dy nam ics in the ap pre hen sion of cer tain his tor i cal
events by Ukrai nian pop u la tion ac cord ing to re gions in the data of the
re search sur vey Re gions in Ukraine: The Dy nam ics, Move ments, and Pol i -
tics [4, p. 50] and in the re sults of the all-na tional poll Ukrai nian So ci -
ety–2004 con ducted by the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy of the NAS of Ukraine. 
The sam ple sizes and meth ods for col lec tion of em pir i cal data (a stan -
dard ized in ter view and a hand out ques tion naire cor re spond ingly) were
dif fer ent. How ever, in both cases, the ques tion word ings and scales were
sim i lar. That is why, we can make a com par i son and this will be cor rect
maybe not as to ab so lute fig ures but as to the dis played ten den cies un -
doubt edly. 
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Ta ble 2
The Dy nam ics of Eval u a tions of the His tor i cal Events
ac cord ing to Macro-re gions, Points
Macro-
re gions




Rev o lu tion 
Col lapse
of the USSR
Dec la ra tion of
the Ukrai nian
in de pend ence
1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004
The Cen ter 2.47 2.36a 2.01 2.15a 1.64 1.55 2.22 2.29
The West 2.56 2.59 2.12 2.21a 1.27 1.29 1.61 1.95b
The East 2.18 2.14 1.57 1.79b 2.40 2.29 2.82 2.83
The South 2.50 2.41a 2.24 2.07b 1.30 1.34 1.84 2.02b
Ukraine 
as a whole 2.43 2.38 2.01 2.08
a 1.62 1.56 2.10 2.25b
a
 — Dif fer ence is sta tis ti cally sig nif i cant; ð < 0.05.
b
 — Dif fer ence is sta tis ti cally sig nif i cant; ð < 0.01.
The data al low con clud ing that the at ti tude of re gional com mu ni ties
to cer tain events from the his tor i cal past of Ukraine can vary over time.
For in stance, at ti tude to the Pereyaslav Coun cil be come less fa vor -
able among the re spon dents from the Cen ter and South. The Oc to ber
Rev o lu tion was given more pos i tive eval u a tions in all re gions ex cept the
South where it is more dis ap proved in com par i son with the poll of 1997.
As to the at ti tude to wards the USSR col lapse, there were reg is tered slight 
dif fer ences within the men tioned time pe riod. 
Due to the so cial and eco nomic prog ress of Ukraine, the at ti tude of re -
spon dents from the East and South to the dec la ra tion of Ukrai nian in de -
pend ence changed for the better. Al though the dis po si tion of these re -
gions to the West and Cen ter did not change, the at ti tude to wards in de -
pend ence changed from a neg a tive-neu tral to a clearly neu tral. 
The lat ter should be em pha sized be cause it en ables to re veal a ten -
dency to wards grad ual elim i na tion of ideo log i cal con tra dic tions be -
tween the West and East-South on the struc ture of Ukraine as a uni tary
state. At the same time, we must be aware of grave con se quences if the
cen tral au thor i ties ac cel er ate this ten dency by ap ply ing ad min is tra tive
mea sures. 
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How ever, the reg is tered tem po ral dif fer ences do not deny the fol low ing 
two phe nom ena. Firstly, the his tor i cal events re lated to the es tab lish -
ment of Ukraine as an in de pend ent state were the most pos i tively eval u -
ated by re spon dents of the West. There is a sta tis ti cally sig nif i cant dif fer -
ence of their eval u a tions from the other macro-re gions (ð < 0.01). Sec -
ondly, the neg a tive eval u a tion of the same events of Ukrai nian his tory is
ob vi ously char ac ter is tic among res i dents of the East and South1.
A re gional fac tor in flu ences the in te gra tive func tion of po lit i cal
 culture due to his tor i cal and spa tial-ter ri to rial iden ti ties of re gional
com mu ni ties. 
In their be hav ior, so cial groups and in di vid u als man i fest iden ti ties of
var i ous kinds, in clud ing po lit i cal and ter ri to rial. The lat ter takes shape
and be comes a weighty fac tor of po lit i cal life in the “multi-layer com mu -
ni ties” (by A. Lijphart) where the pop u la tion groups are di vided ac cord -
ing to the seg ment dif fer ences, mostly socio-cultural and ideological.
An in di vid ual en ter a spa tial-ter ri to rial com mu nity in the fol low ing
way: he/she looks for the com mu nity, which gives the in di vid ual con fi -
dence; per ceives that he/she is an el e ment of this com mu nity, i.e. united
with “us”; feels af fil i a tion with this com mu nity, sol i dar ity with it;
internalizes group ide als, val ues, needs, aims, and stan dards; as sumes
a re spon si bil ity to this com mu nity.
Anal y sis of the spa tial-ter ri to rial iden ti fi ca tion en ables to de ter mine
an in di vid ual’s iden ti fi ca tion with a spa tial-ter ri to rial com mu nity, as
well as his/her self-iden ti fi ca tion as a so cial ac tor within a cer tain spa -
tial-ter ri to rial com mu nity. 
Tak ing into ac count the con tacts with dif fer ent com mu ni ties, an in di -
vid ual per son i fies and em bod ies iden ti ties that in flu ence each other as
self-iden ti fi ca tions with these com mu ni ties. 
Dis tinc tions be tween the re gional po lit i cal iden ti ties are de ter mined
by per ma nent and tran si tory fac tors. The for mer de pend on set tle ment
type, eth nic com po si tion, con fes sion, his tor i cal iden tity, ori en ta tions to
de moc racy or to tal i tar i an ism, ste reo type ideas of a re gional au ton omy or 
a uni tary state. Tran si tory fac tors re late to the situative in ter ests of re -
gional elites, al lo ca tion of the na tional in for ma tion re sources and con -
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Heated dis cus sions on grant ing war riors of the Ukrai nian Re volt Army (Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka
Armiia), the sta tus of vet er ans of the Great Pa tri otic War of 1941–1945 (Velyka Vitchyzniana
Viyna) also con firm ex is tence of dif fer ent ideas, among re gional com mu ni ties of Ukraine, about
the com mon past and dif fer ences in his tor i cal iden ti ties. 
fig u ra tion of the re gional mass me dia space, as well as cur rent events
(like elec tion cam paigns). 
Be ing de pend ent on each other, all these fac tors may de ter mine “the
re gional de vel op ment pat tern” — be ing his tor i cally formed, the type of
re gional iden tity re pro duc tion, the “socio-cul tural code” of a re gion es -
sen tial to its en tire de vel op ment [21, p. 79].
In the so cial space, an in di vid ual’s iden ti ties are pre sented in hor i -
zon tal and ver ti cal di men sions. We speak of a ver ti cal iden tity be ing
formed in the spa tial-ter ri to rial sphere of com mu ni ties on the dif fer ent
lev els. That is why, the spa tial-ter ri to rial iden ti fi ca tion can be re garded
ver ti cally: from a lo cal set tle ment where an in di vid ual lives to the
macro- iden ti fi ca tion with the “world cit i zens”. 
In our sur veys, to re veal the spa tial-ter ri to rial iden ti fi ca tion, re spon -
dents were of fered the 7-point scale where one point cor re sponded to the
lo cal level (of a set tle ment) and seven points meant the macro-level
(world cit i zen). All gra da tions were in te grated into the four lev els of iden -
ti fi ca tion. 
The lo cal level in cluded the iden ti fi ca tion with a set tle ment or a re -
gion. It was rea son able tak ing into ac count the spe cific in ter pre ta tion of
the term “re gion” by re spon dents. The na tional level cor re sponded to the
iden ti fi ca tion with Ukrai nian peo ple and rep re sen ta tives of their own
eth nic ity/na tion, the post-so viet level meant the iden ti fi ca tion with the
ex-USSR’s pop u la tion. The trans na tional level united those who iden ti -
fied them selves with the cit i zens of Eu rope and of the whole world. 
In the postmodern world, an in di vid ual en ters a new sys tem of the
self-de ter mi na tion and self-iden ti fi ca tion. Due to ac tive in ter ac tion with 
var i ous cul tures, with the help of mass me dia, the in di vid ual iden ti fies
him self/her self not only with lo cal com mu ni ties (here and now), but also 
be comes in volved in the global so cial space. 
There is an other rea son to an a lyze the po si tion “world cit i zen”. On the 
one hand, it can be un der stood as the ex tent to which an in di vid ual re al -
izes his/her free dom gained due to the fallen “iron cur tain” of the closed
so viet sys tem, lib er a tion from the to tal con trol, and de sire to be come ac -
quainted with the achieve ments in the world cul ture. On the other hand,
it can mean an in dif fer ence to the na tional achieve ments and val ues or
be a re sult of bro ken con nec tions be tween gen er a tions and dis re gard of
tra di tions. 
“In ter na tion al iza tion” and “glob al iza tion” are very pop u lar terms in
the pres ent-day dis cus sions. In East ern and West ern Eu rope, more at -
ten tion is paid to the in ter na tional as pects of pol i tics and pub lic ori en ta -
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tions. But it should be re mem bered that these ori en ta tions cor re sponds
mainly to the elite’s ideas, while peo ple feel rest ful and ori ent them selves
well mostly among their lo cal com mu nity. 
In Ukraine, be long ing to a re gion or a na tion is the dom i nant space for 
so cial ex pe ri ence, ori en ta tion, and emo tional con tacts. For the past five
years, the level of lo cal self-iden ti fi ca tion has been low er ing, while the
na tional one has be come stron ger. Many peo ple con sider them selves
still be long ing to the USSR as the space for their emo tional iden ti fi ca -
tion. For the men tioned pe riod, their num ber has sig nif i cantly de -
creased, but it is rather con sid er able. 
The fact that in the pre am ble to the Con sti tu tion of the USSR of 1977,
there was de clared a new com mu nity called the so viet peo ple, gave a
strong ideo log i cal sup port to the so viet to tal i tar i an ism and left its im -
print on the mass con scious ness. The So viet Un ion has col lapsed, but
the so viet peo ple ex ist. 
So cio log i cal sur veys ev i dence that many Ukrai ni ans man i fest their
new po lit i cal iden ti ties ac cord ing to the eco nomic cir cum stances. In the
spring of 1996, i.e. five years af ter the in de pend ence had been de clared,
only one fourth of re spon dents sup ported the Ukrai nian in de pend ence.
This hap pened be cause of the un fa vor able so cial and eco nomic sit u a -
tion [4, pp. 46–47].
Due to grad ual im prove ment of the eco nomic sit u a tion, there was an
in crease in the num ber of pro po nents of Ukraine’s in de pend ence. In
2001, over 56% of re spon dents were ready to con firm their choice of the
in de pend ence of Ukraine in the case of ref er en dum1.
The cos mo pol i tan iden ti fi ca tion and de sire to be come a cit i zen of the
world are still in the last place. More over, in 2005, the num ber of such re -
spon dents is half as much than it was in the first poll. 
So cio log i cal mon i tor ing reg is ters a grad ual low er ing of the lo cal
self-iden ti fi ca tion level in all re gions for the past five years. A sharp drop
is ob served in the West. In 2000, this re gion had the most nu mer ous
group of the lo cal self-iden ti fi ca tion; five years later, this num ber re -
duced to the av er age for the whole coun try. As to re gional com mu ni ties of 
the East and South, the num ber of lo cal self-iden ti fi ca tion bear ers did
not de cline sig nif i cantly, but there is an other rea son to talk about them.
A pain ful fact that the can di date whom they had sup ported in the last
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The mat ter con cerns the all-na tional poll within the pro ject SOCIS-Om ni bus. A rep re sen ta tive
sam ple in cluded 1200 re spon dents. The method of data col lec tion was a stan dard ized in ter view in 
the place of res i dence. 
pres i den tial elec tion failed did not cause (as would be ex pected) any
growth of the lo cal self-iden ti fi ca tion be ing one of the pos si ble ways to ex -
press a dis agree ment with the other can di date’s vic tory. 
Ta ble 3
The Dy nam ics of the Spa tial-ter ri to rial Selfidentification
ac cord ing to Macro-re gions, %
 Self- iden -
tification
level 
The Cen ter The West The East The South Ukraineas a whole
Lo cal 
2000 36.8 44.5 37.2 36.9 38.3
2004 41.7 36.6 37.8 31.9 37.3
2005 31.9 26.7 32.6 31.3 31.0
Na tional 
2000 49.8 43.9 34.4 34.0 41.1
2004 47.8 57.2 38.8 47.4 47.4
2005 60.1 66.9 50.3 50.8 56.7
Post-so viet
2000 7.8 1.8 20.2 17.8 12.2
2004 6.4 2.5 18.2 15.5 10.8
2005 4.9 1.8 13.2 12.0 8.1
Trans na tional
2000 5.5 9.8 8.2 11.2 8.4
2004 2.5 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.2
2005 2.4 3.1 2.7 5.0 3.3
At the same time, the na tional self-iden ti fi ca tion has sig nif i cantly
grown in all re gions; this is a pos i tive ten dency for the in te gra tion of
Ukrai nian so ci ety. In the East and South, a con sid er able drop in num -
bers of those who iden tify them selves with the pop u la tion of the USSR
may bring about changes in the con fig u ra tion of po lit i cal iden tity for ter -
ri to rial com mu ni ties of these re gions. 
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The re gional fac tor of in te gra tive func tion for po lit i cal cul ture is also
de ter mines the ori en ta tions of ter ri to rial com mu ni ties to the de sir able
line of a re gion’s de vel op ment in the di men sion of “na tional in te -
gra tion — re gional au ton omy”.
There are two di rec tions of the de sir able vec tor of re gional de vel op -
ment: a) uni tary, ori ented mainly to the con nec tions with the other re -
gions (ob lasts) and in te gra tion in Ukraine as a whole; b) au ton o mous
that im plies to use the po ten tial of a re gion. The data of two polls, Re gions 
of Ukraine of 1997 and Ukrai nian So ci ety of 2004, formed our em pir i cal
base. 
The ques tion word ings did not dif fer; how ever, in the first case, re -
spon dents had six op tions, while in the sec ond one — only three. It hap -
pened so, be cause in the poll of 1997 there were op tions re lated to the
for eign pol icy ori en ta tion; it was meth od olog i cally wrong. It is not im por -
tant for our sur vey, be cause we do not com pare ab so lute fig ures but re -
veal only the gen eral trend in the uni tary and au ton o mous ori en ta tions.
The data pre sented in Ta ble 4 do not in clude other fac tors of re gional de -
vel op ment, apart from uni tary or au ton o mous. 
Ta ble 4
The Dy nam ics of Ori en ta tions to the De sir able Line
of De vel op ment for Macro-re gions, %
Macro-re gions
Ori en ta tions to the line of de vel op ment 
Uni tary Au ton o mous
1997 2004 1997 2004
The Cen ter 37.1 52.1 11.9 25.0
The West 43.8 57.5 10.8 25.5
The East 22.8 55.1 13.6 30.0
The South 26.7 49.1 10.4 30.8
Ukraine as a whole 32.2 53.0 11.7 27.7
Among all macro-re gions, in 1997, res i dents of the West and Cen ter
man i fested the stron gest sup port of the uni tary way of de vel op ment;
there is a sta tis ti cally sig nif i cant dif fer ence be tween them and the
East-South (p < 0.01). As to the sup port of au ton o mous de vel op ment,
there was no es sen tial dif fer ence be tween macro-re gions. 
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Seven years later, res i dents of the West gave the stron gest sup port of
the uni tary de vel op ment. As dis tinct from the first poll, there were re -
vealed sig nif i cant dif fer ences not only in the South, but also in the Cen -
ter. In the East, the sup port of uni tary de vel op ment was al most the same
as in the West. As to the au ton o mous de vel op ment vec tor, it is still
equally sup ported among all macro-re gions. There is one ex cep tion: the
South and Cen ter man i fested two ex treme po si tions — the stron gest and 
weak est sup port of au ton o mous de vel op ment cor re spond ingly. How ever, 
it is im por tant that in both polls the num ber of those who sup ported the
de vel op ment of con nec tions with other re gions and in te gra tion into
Ukraine is es sen tially more than the num ber of those who pre ferred to
rely on re gional re sources and sup ported cen trif u gal ten den cies in the
po lit i cal sys tem. 
An a lyz ing the in te gra tive func tion of po lit i cal cul ture, we can de ter -
mine peo ple’s ori en ta tions as to po lit i cal sys tem, ba sic val ues, and po lit -
i cal in sti tu tions. 
Le git i macy of po lit i cal sys tem is based on the trust in po lit i cal in sti -
tu tions. Po lit i cal sys tem and gov ern ment hav ing a high de gree of le git i -
macy are more ef fec tive when they work out and pur sue the strat egy of
po lit i cal de vel op ment. In dem o cratic so ci et ies, elec tion on a com pet i tive
ba sis and ob ser vance of con sti tu tional pro ce dures pro vide for le git i -
macy of state power. In tran si tional so ci et ies, in clud ing Ukraine, po lit i -
cal lead ers usu ally lay their claims to le git i macy mak ing prom ises dur -
ing an elec tion cam paign, which are of ten un ful filled. 
When L. Kuchma took the place of L. Kravchuk as a po lit i cal leader,
the stron gest trust in the gov ern men tal au thor i ties was reg is tered in the
West and Cen ter. Ten years later, the sit u a tion changed cru cially; the
level of trust in po lit i cal tri um vi rate was no tice ably higher in the East
and South. This is an ev i dence of dif fer ent at ti tude of re gional com mu ni -
ties to the po lit i cal re gime un der L. Kuchma. The re sults of the elec tion of 
2004 dem on strated that dif fer ent lev els of trust deeply in flu enced elec -
toral pref er ences in re gions. At the same time, ir re spec tive of ab so lute
fig ures, the trust in all branches of power grown af ter the Or ange Rev o lu -
tion can elim i nate the reg is tered re gional dis tinc tions. 
Po lit i cal iden tity of re gional com mu ni ties is also of great im por -
tance to the in te gra tive func tion of po lit i cal cul ture. It can be opera -
tionalized by means of ques tions about the ad her ence to a cer tain po lit i -
cal ide ol ogy or move ment (po lit i cal pref er ences), na tional pride, and re -
spon dents’ per cep tion of Ukraine as their na tive land.
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Ta ble 5
The Dy nam ics of Trust in Po lit i cal In sti tu tions by Macro-re gions




The dy nam ics of trust Ukraine
as a wholeThe Cen ter The West The East The South
N Points N Points N Points N Points N Points
Pres i dent of Ukraine
1994 597 2.48 324 2.73 403 1.90 483 2.19 1807 2.32
2004 588 2.19 326 2.00 402 2.50 481 2.43 1797 2.29
2005 590 3.65 325 4.08 401 2.65 482 3.16 1798 3.37
Gov ern ment 
1994 597 2.43 324 2.44 403 2.11 483 2.27 1807 2.32
2004 587 2.22 326 2.18 402 2.40 480 2.37 1795 2.29
2005 589 3.24 325 3.71 399 2.54 480 2.94 1793 3.09
Verkhovna Rada 
1994 597 2.34 324 2.41 403 2.19 483 2.21 1807 2.29
2004 587 2.12 326 2.04 402 2.23 482 2.30 1797 2.18
2005 590 3.09 325 3.41 401 2.43 480 2.80 1796 2.92
As re gards the ad her ence to a cer tain po lit i cal ide ol ogy, there are four
cat e go ries. Pro po nents of the left-wing par ties, in our case, com mu nists
and so cial ists, form the first one. The sec ond cat e gory in cludes ad her -
ents of cen trists: so cial dem o crats, na tional dem o crats, Chris tian dem -
o crats (ac cord ing to the poll of 1994), and Green pol i tics (the polls of
2004 and 2005). We added to them a small group of those who sup ported 
the re li gious (fun da men tal ist) ide ol ogy. The third cat e gory con sists of the 
right-wing pro po nents: na tion al ists and lib er als. The last cat e gory col -
lected those who have not de fined their po si tion or kept away from all
main po lit i cal forces. 
Com par ing the data of 2004 and 2005 with the ones of 1994, we can
note cer tain changes. For ex am ple, the fol low ing ide ol o gies, such as an -
ar chist, anarcho-syndicalist, and fun da men tal ist (re li gious), were not
in cluded, while the en vi ron men tal one was added. As a re sult, the list
was short ened to eight po lit i cal ide ol o gies. 
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Ta ble 6
The Dy nam ics of Po lit i cal Pref er ences
Seg ments
of the po lit -
i cal spec -
trum
The dy nam ics of pref er ences as to macro-re gions Ukraine as
a whole The Cen ter The West The East The South
N % N % N % N % N %
The Left
1994 593 17.9 320  6.6 396 34.6 481 24.1 1790 21.2
2004 590 25.6 323 10.5 402 34.8 482 27.8 1797 25.5
2005 590 21.2 326 10.1 402 26.1 482 21.6 1800 20.4
Cen trists 
1994 593 14.5 320 29.1 396 11.6 481 14.1 1790 16.4
2004 590 24.1 323 34.7 402 16.2 482 24.9 1797 21.8
2005 590 26.1 326 39.9 402 29.1 482 30.1 1800 30.0
The Right 
1994 593  3.4 320  6.6 396  3.5 481  3.1 1790  3.9
2004 590  3.1 323  7.4 402  2.0 482  1.9 1797  3.3
2005 590  1.7 326  8.9 402  2.0 482  2.1 1800  3.2
Have not de fined their po si tion / Dis tanced them selves
1994 593 63.1 320 56.9 396 51.5 481 58.8 1790 58.3
2004 590 46.4 323 47.1 402 46.0 482 44.8 1797 46.0
2005 590 50.9 326 38.0 402 40.8 482 45.2 1800 44.8
The ob tained re sults con firm that, for the past de cade, there have
been sig nif i cant dif fer ences in the at ti tude to po lit i cal ide ol o gies in re -
gions. How ever, as to the in te gra tive func tion of po lit i cal cul ture, there
could be seen a grad ual re ori en ta tion of re gional com mu ni ties to the
cen trist po lit i cal forces. This ten dency is cru cial for re spon dents of the
East and South where the last two years made the num ber of cen trist
pro po nents larger than the num ber of left-wing sup port ers. More over,
spe cial so cio log i cal sur veys reg is tered in es sen tial in flu ence of po lit i cal
par ties, in clud ing the Left, on the cur rent pro test move ment in Donbas
[22, p. 120]. A con sid er able num ber of left-wing sup port ers in the Cen ter 
can be ex plained by the fact that, in this re gion, the elec tor ate of the So -
cial ist Party leader, O. Moroz, is con cen trated. 
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The new par lia men tary elec tion cam paign of 2006 can bring about
changes on the po lit i cal scene. Most po lit i cal par ties and blocks are
tend ing to wards pop u lism, Left rhet o ric, pa ter nal is tic ideas, and gov -
ern men tal in ter ven tion in eco nomic ac tiv ity. At the same time, there is
no in flu en tial party would be able to stand for lib eral val ues. Un der such
cir cum stances, the dis tinc tions be tween most par ties are elim i nated
and the op por tu nity for “po lit i cal ma neu ver ing” is af forded mainly for
the left ideo log i cal di rec tion. 
Na tional pride is one of the ba sic in di ca tors of the at ti tude to po lit i cal
sys tem and na tion. Un der po lit i cal in sta bil ity and so cial trans for ma -
tion, this feel ing of com mon iden tity and com mon his tory can con sol i -
date the so ci ety. 
The 5-point scale mea sured the level of na tional pride, where one
point meant the ab sence of pride, and five points — the great est pride.
We used the data of Ukrai nian So ci ety mon i tor ing.
Ta ble 7
The Dy nam ics of the Na tional Pride Level, %
Macro-re gions 2002 2003 2004 2005
The Cen ter 3.38 3.17 3.15 3.66
The West 3.73 3.42 3.50 3.99
The East 3.07 2.83 2.82 3.06
The South 2.96 2.86 3.06 3.29
Ukraine as a whole 3.26 3.06 3.11 3.48
As we can see, the high est level of na tional pride was reg is tered in the
West. It showed growth and was at the high in 2005. This is an ev i dence
of the re gional iden tity of peo ple who live in West ern Ukraine, es pe cially
Galychyna; it can be clearly seen in their un der stand ing of his tor i cal
her i tage and at ti tude to the na tional idea. 
At the same time, res i dents of the East iden tify them selves with lo cal
com mu ni ties with out “his tor i cal iden tity”. Sym bolic pov erty is a re sult
of his tory of this re gion, es pe cially Donbas, be ing an area of heavy in dus -
try, a cen ter of ac tiv ity for ty coons and work ers that were mainly peas -
ants by or i gin. 
It is worth men tion ing that, for the past three years, es pe cially af ter
the Or ange Rev o lu tion, there has been a grad ual growth of na tional pride 
in all macro-re gions. This is fa vor able for the in te gra tive func tion of po -
lit i cal cul ture of re gional com mu ni ties. 
106 Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2004–2005
Oleksandr Stegniy
How ever, we have to keep in mind the at ten tion of the world com mu -
nity to the events in Ukraine dur ing the Or ange Rev o lu tion, es pe cially in
West ern Eu rope and North Amer ica. Ukrai ni ans were happy that their
coun try was talked about, first and fore most in the con text of the mass
so cial up ris ing, wak en ing of Ukrai nian peo ple. 
Na tional pride of re spon dents goes to gether with the at ti tude to Uk rai -
ne as their na tive land. To mea sure this at ti tude, we used two in di ca tors:
per cep tion of Ukraine as their na tive land and choice of Ukraine as their
na tive land. The data of Ukrai nian So ci ety formed the em pir i cal base.
Ta ble 8
The Dy nam ics of Re spon dents’ At ti tude to Ukraine
as their Na tive Land, %
Macro-re gions
Per cep tion of Ukraine
as their na tive land
Pos si bil ity to choose
Ukraine as their
na tive land
2002 2003 2005 2004 2005
The West 91.8 88.0 97.5 74.2 88.6
The Cen ter 89.2 84.6 94.4 58.9 83.6
The East 82.7 70.6 84.8 56.1 67.1
The South 69.5 61.4 86.1 61.4 66.1
Ukraine as a whole 84.2 76.7 90.6 61.3 78.8
First of all, we would like to stress the growth in pos i tive at ti tude of re -
spon dents to Ukraine as their na tive land af ter the Or ange Rev o lu tion in
all macro-re gions.
How ever, res i dents of the West and Cen ter more of ten think of
Ukraine as their na tive land than those who live in the East and South
(dif fer ences are sta tis ti cally sig nif i cant; p < 0.01). The num ber of those
who would choose Ukraine as their na tive land (“un doubt edly yes” and
“pos si bly yes”) was the larg est in the West and the small est in the South. 
So, the in te gra tive func tion of po lit i cal cul ture, ac cord ing to the at ti -
tude to Ukraine as their na tive land, is the most ex plicit among res i dents
of the West, while the low est re sults be long to the South. The Cen ter is
closer to the West, while the East is closer to the South (there were reg is -
tered slight dif fer ences). 
De spite the reg is tered dif fer ences, we can talk about the ba sic ten -
dency to wards the for ma tion of com mon na tional and state iden tity in
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Ukraine. In the West and Cen ter, this fact can be ex plained by V. Yus -
chen ko’s vic tory that aroused great ad mi ra tion, while in the East and
South, there are other fac tors. A plau si ble rea son for strength en ing of
pos i tive at ti tude to Ukraine in those macro-re gions could be a pro tec tive
re ac tion af ter they had been ac cused of sep a rat ism and ab sence of pa tri -
otic feel ings. 
Re gional Fac tor of the Ac ti vat ing Func tion
An a lyz ing the in flu ence of a re gional fac tor in the ac ti vat ing func tion
of po lit i cal cul ture, we take into ac count the in fra struc ture of so cial and
po lit i cal ac tiv ity, the re gional agents form ing a po lit i cal cul ture, and the
de gree of au thor i tar i an ism in ter ri to rial com mu ni ties. We con sider the
fol low ing in di ca tors: po lit i cal ac tiv ity and po lit i cal in volve ment, as well
as po lit i cal ef fi ciency and readi ness to so cial pro test. 
The di ver sity of this in fra struc ture at the re gional level may be con -
sid ered as an en vi ron ment to in volve the mass in so cial and po lit i cal life
in or der to or ga nize ter ri to rial com mu ni ties so cially and po lit i cally. 
Avail able in for ma tion sources1 con firm that there are suf fi cient num -
bers of pub lic or ga ni za tions, po lit i cal par ties, and un ions reg is tered in all
macro-re gions of Ukraine. How ever, spe cial sur veys [23; 24] show that ac -
tu ally work ing pub lic or ga ni za tions, for a va ri ety of rea sons, are dif fi cult
to no tice. Firstly, the three-level reg is tra tion sys tem with out ex change of
in for ma tion be tween gov ern men tal au thor i ties cre ates se vere ob sta cles;
sec ondly, the com pli cated liq ui da tion pro cess may also en tail nu mer ous
dummy or ga ni za tions. As a re sult, among more than 40 thou sand reg is -
tered non-gov ern men tal or ga ni za tions, only one tenth can be con sid ered
as ca pa ble of func tion ing [23, p. 3]. The same sit u a tion can be seen as to
po lit i cal par ties and blocks, most of which are the “sofa” or ga ni za tions.
So, at the re gional level, there ex ists an ad e quate in fra struc ture for
so cial and po lit i cal self-or ga ni za tion of ter ri to rial com mu ni ties, but its
abil ity in in flu enc ing the so cial and po lit i cal self-or ga ni za tion of peo ple
is still un cer tain. 
Un der ex ist ing con di tions, the re gional agents form ing a po lit i cal
cul ture, es pe cially re gional elites, as sume im por tance. 
Re gional elites had quite prag matic mo tives to sup port the Ukraine’s
in de pend ence. Those who had ex er cised power in the so viet time re -
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1
See: Web-por tals of the Coun ter part Cre ative Cen ter (http://ccc.kiev.ua) and the in for ma tion
pro ject of the Com mit tee of Vot ers of Ukraine “Po lit i cal Ukraine” (www.polit.com.ua). 
garded in de pend ence as the most ef fec tive means to re tain all what they
had in the pe riod of eco nomic slump en vel oped all spheres of the post-
 so viet econ omy. Re gional elites had what they did not want to lose, that is 
why they readily shared the con struc tion of ideo log i cal and cul tural
facade of the state with na tional-dem o crats. 
At ti tude of re gional elites to the cen tral Ukrai nian power as an in her -
ited sys tem in cludes two stra te gic lines and in ter ac tion pat terns, such
as mod ern is tic and anti-mod ern is tic. In ev ery Ukrai nian macro-re gion,
some rep re sen ta tives of re gional elites dem on strate mod ern is tic ori en -
ta tions, while oth ers tend to au thor i tar i an ism like in the so viet time. 
In such a sys tem, as to re la tions with a po lit i cal struc ture, po lit i cal
ac tors can be re garded as “our” and “strang ers”. “Our” are in ter ested to
pre serve the sta tus quo, while “strang ers” ad here to re forms and de mand 
changes in leg is la tion with the hope for an im prove ment of cur rent state. 
But “strang ers” sup port changes only un til they con sti tute a threat to
their safety. In this case, their own po lit i cal lon gev ity be comes more im -
por tant than po lit i cal pro grams and con cep tions. So, pol i tics is not a re -
al iza tion of so cial well-be ing, but rather logic of the sei zure of power, as
Le nin saw it. 
What be hav ior pat tern do re gional elites pre fer, mod ern is tic or au -
thor i tar ian? We can an swer this ques tion ac cord ing to the ap proaches
sug gested by Ger man so ci ol o gists, tak ing into ac count: at ti tude to the
cur rent trans for ma tions of re gime and re gional pol icy; po lit i cal goals
and strat e gies for their achieve ment; dis cur sive prac tices of ter ri to rial
com mu ni ties; their po si tions in po lit i cal sys tem of Ukraine, and ex ter nal 
con tacts [17, p. 168].
To elu ci date this ap proach, we of fer the typology of re gional elite in
Lviv oblast rep re sented by two main groups. The first one con sists of
moral na tion al ists, and the sec ond one — of func tional-prag matic ac -
tors. In the first group, there are two sub groups: a) au thor i tar ian na tion -
al ists, who stress the strong cen tral iza tion of power and au thor i tar ian
gov ern ment, b) civil na tion al ists with dem o cratic ideas about the state
de vel op ment. Both sub groups stirred the masses to greater po lit i cal ac -
tiv ity in the end of 1980s — be gin ning of 1990s and par tic i pated in the
Or ange Rev o lu tion. The sec ond group in cludes the for mer so viet ad min -
is tra tors who work, as a rule, at gov ern ment bod ies and po lit i cally ac tive
busi ness peo ple tak ing a prag matic ap proach to pol i tics [17, p. 168].
De spite the men tioned dif fer ences, the elite of Lviv reaches a con sen -
sus on the na tional is sue. More over, the elite’s at ti tude cor re sponds with 
the at ti tude of com mon peo ple. This can be seen in their elec toral be hav -
ior, like sup port of right and right-cen trist par ties. 
Re gional Fac tor of the De vel op ment of the Ukrai nian’s Po lit i cal Cul ture
Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2004–2005 109
As to the re gional elite of Donbas, its ori en ta tions are de ter mined by
the high con cen tra tion of in dus trial en ter prises, which were tools of po -
lit i cal and so cial con trol over work ers in the so viet time. Through a col -
lec tive, the plant man ager can de fine the sol i dar ity level and ei ther
unites work ers or sep a rates. In the so viet time, it was quite a sym bolic
col lec tiv ism, be cause the col lec tive was not a self-or ga ni za tion of work -
ers but or ga nized from the top. Work ers de pended on man ag ers and ex -
pected from them pro tec tion from risks at their places of work. How ever,
some of the ap plied strat e gies brought about the in di vid u al iza tion ef -
fect. Trade un ions were also or ga nized from the top; they were el e ments
of the plant man age ment. 
Now a days, low pro fes sional mo bil ity, ten dency to wards pro fes sional
and ter ri to rial self-iden ti fi ca tion are es pe cially char ac ter is tic of the coal
in dus try where most work ers iden tify them selves with their plant and lo -
cal pop u la tion. They still de pend on man ag ers not only at work, but also
in var i ous kinds of so cial main te nance. In such so cial and eco nomic
con di tions, the lead ing re gional ac tors, form ing po lit i cal cul ture among
res i dents of the East, are di rec torial boards of the large-scale in dus trial
en ter prises. 
The lo cal elite is proud of its be long ing to the “old in dus trial re gion”;
they re fer to la bor tra di tions and en gi neer ing achieve ments. Be cause
they do not see al ter na tive path of the re gion’s de vel op ment, ex cept in -
dus trial, at ti tude to changes is pas sive. 
The agents form ing po lit i cal cul ture also in flu ence the pop u lar ity of
au thor i tar ian at ti tude among re gional Ukrai nian com mu ni ties. This
is sue is es pe cially im por tant if we talk about le gal as pects of events re -
lated to the pres i den tial elec tion of 2004 and pros pects of a po lit i cal re -
form. 
In 1994, au thor i tar ian at ti tude en joyed the wid est pop u lar ity in the
East and South, in con trast to the Cen ter and West. Ten years later, the
num ber of those who pre ferred the “strong arm” in creased, first of all, in
the West and then in the Cen ter, while res i dents of the East and South
be came more dem o crat i cally ori ented. Af ter the Or ange Rev o lu tion, the
sit u a tion has changed cru cially. 
The pres i den tial elec tion of 2004 con firmed that trust in po lit i cal in -
sti tu tions de pends sig nif i cantly on the pub lic at ti tude to laws cur rently
in force. Dur ing the elec tion, ma nip u la tions of the elec toral law re sulted
in con tra dic tions be tween right and law, le git i macy and le gal ity. Le git i -
macy with out laws loses its pro ce dural char ac ter and be comes lim ited.
As a re sult, dur ing the elec tion of 2004, in Ukraine, there was no pres i -
110 Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2004–2005
Oleksandr Stegniy
den tial con tender of full value. In stead of this, we had “half-pres i dents of 
the three pres i dents’ half-re pub lic” [25]. One of them was the man da tory 
of Maidan, the sec ond — of the Cen tral Elec tion Com mis sion, the
third — of the Con sti tu tion. Law was in ca pa ble of pro tect ing the  inte -
rests of so ci ety by fol low ing le gal pro ce dure. 
Ma nip u la tions of the elec toral law that dis re garded the in ter ests of
so ci ety and was not based on the au thor ity of ju di cial branch, led to the
cri sis sit u a tion when laws lost their le git i macy and ap pli ca tion of laws
failed. More over, the main fig ures of the elec tion ac knowl edged their own 
ig no rance of law. The first pres i den tial con tender rushed to take his oath
at the par lia ment, while an other de manded from the Cen tral Elec tion
Com mis sion an nounce ment of the re turns of the sec ond round of vot ing
pre ma turely. Be fore the sec ond round re-vot ing, in mass meet ings, both
can di dates ap pealed to their sup port ers not to ad mit the com pet i tor’s
vic tory. 
Ta ble 9
The Dy nam ics of Re gional Dis tri bu tion of An swers to the Ques tion:
“Do you agree that sev eral strong lead ers can do for our coun try




The Cen ter The West The East The South Ukraine as a whole
1994
Agree 33.7 39.3 46.2 46.2 40.8
Do not agree 18.8 19.8 16.8 13.5 17.1
Do not know 47.6 40.9 36.9 40.3 42.1
2004
Agree 44.1 50.9 45.3 48.3 48.3
Do not agree 16.5 16.6 19.5 21.2 18.4
Do not know 39.4 32.5 35.3 30.5 34.8
2005
Agree 58.0 60.7 63.8 57.6 59.7
Do not agree 24.2 22.7 16.4 23.7 22.1
Do not know 17.8 16.6 19.7 18.7 18.2
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At the elec tion of 2004, fight for the pres i dency was so hard be cause
of un ques tioned au thor ity of the state leader. This as pect is es pe cially
im por tant if we take into ac count the peo ple’s at ti tude to the pros pects of 
a po lit i cal re form and the ex pected pub lic sup port of the tran si tion to a
par lia ment-pres i den tial form of gov ern ment. 
As to the sup port of to tal i tar i an ism, there is a growth of au thor i tar ian
val ues in all macro-re gions and so through out Ukraine. A side ef fect of
the changes in at ti tude to the “strong arm” is that the num ber of those
who could not de fine their po si tions de creased.
Po lit i cal ac tiv ity and in volve ment of peo ple in di cate their par tic i -
pa tion in so cial and po lit i cal life. To operationalize this in dex, we used
the fol low ing em pir i cal in di ca tors: mem ber ship in pub lic or po lit i cal or -
ga ni za tions, par tic i pa tion in po lit i cal meet ings and con tacts with ac tiv -
ists of pub lic and po lit i cal move ments or par ties. 
Ac cord ing to the data ob tained, the in volve ment of Ukrai ni ans in
pub lic or po lit i cal or ga ni za tions dif fer ences does not vary greatly. Over
the last eleven years, the level of mem ber ship has been de creased no tice -
ably in the West and in creased in the South. In the other re gions, as well
as through out Ukraine, this value has not changed sig nif i cantly. The lat -
ter con firms that not only or di nary peo ple, but also the sub jects of so cial
and po lit i cal ac tiv ity, first of all, pri mary branches of po lit i cal par ties and 
pub lic or ga ni za tions, are pas sive. 
Ta ble 10
The Dy nam ics of Mem ber ship in Pub lic and Po lit i cal Or ga ni za tions
by Macro-re gions, %
Macro-re gions 1994 2004 2005
The Cen ter 16.7 16.1 13.4
The West 21.9 23.9 16.0
The East 14.8 12.9 17.7
The South 16.0 13.9 18.9
Ukraine as a whole 17.0 16.2 16.3
The pub lic opin ion polls dem on strate that the par tic i pa tion in po lit i -
cal meet ings and con tacts with ac tiv ists of po lit i cal par ties were in fre -
quent in com par i son with the first years of Ukrai nian in de pend ence. It
was typ i cal of all re gions. For in stance, in No vem ber 1991, res i dents of
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the West took the most ac tive part in po lit i cal meet ings. How ever, in 2004 
this in dex dropped and was al most the same as in the East. By the way,
peo ple’s par tic i pa tion in po lit i cal meet ings re mained the same only in
the East. As to the con tacts with ac tiv ists of po lit i cal par ties, in No vem -
ber 1991, peo ple were more ac tive in the West than in the South or East;
in the Cen ter, this in dex was the same as through out Ukraine. Ac cord ing 
to the poll of 2004, such con tacts were fre quent only in the West. 
Per haps, this is ev i dence of a low peo ple’s ac tiv ity, as well as of weak
or ga ni za tional in fra struc ture of lead ing po lit i cal sub jects at the re gional
level.
It is worth men tion ing that the mon i tor ing sur vey of 2005 re vealed
strik ing dif fer ences be tween re gions dur ing the Or ange Rev o lu tion. For
ex am ple, al most the half of res i dents from Kyiv and West ern Ukraine but
only about one fourth from the Cen ter sup ported meet ings. In the East
and South, their pro por tion was es sen tially smaller (8% and 5% re spec -
tively).
Ta ble 11 rep re sents the dy nam ics of par tic i pa tion in meet ings and
con tacts with ac tiv ists. How ever, it is not taken into ac count how of ten
peo ple par tic i pate in meet ings or con tact with po lit i cal ac tiv ists.
Ta ble 11
The Dy nam ics of Par tic i pa tion in Po lit i cal Meet ings and Con tacts
with Po lit i cal Ac tiv ists, %
Macro-
re gions





Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
The Cen ter 16.0 78.2  9.7b 89.1 19.0 73.2 11.2b 86.2
The West 23.4 72.1 17.2a 80.1 24.2 69.4 18.5 76.9
The East 13.4 83.0 12.2 85.8 15.6 81.2  7.3b 87.2
The South 14.4 81.3  7.8b 89.1 16.1 79.6 8.5b 87.1
Ukraine as
a whole 16.5 78.9 11.1
b 86.7 18.5 76.1 10.9b 85.0
a
 — Dif fer ence is sta tis ti cally sig nif i cant; p < 0.05.
b
 — Dif fer ence is sta tis ti cally sig nif i cant; p < 0.01.
Re gional Fac tor of the De vel op ment of the Ukrai nian’s Po lit i cal Cul ture
Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2004–2005 113
Po lit i cal ef fi ciency and readi ness to ex press a pro test are re garded as
an abil ity of cit i zens to ex ert in flu ence on the sub jects of po lit i cal ac tiv ity. 
We mea sured this in dex of po lit i cal cul ture on the ba sis of the fol low ing
em pir i cal in di ca tors: abil ity of re spon dents to re sist the gov ern men tal
and lo cal au thor i ties when they vi o late peo ple’s rights and in ter ests;
readi ness of re spon dents to par tic i pate in var i ous ac tions to as sert their
rights and in ter ests. 
Within the last eleven years, the pro por tion of those who were able (at
least ver bally) to re sist the gov ern ment de crees in fring ing the rights and
in ter ests was small. Af ter the Or ange Rev o lu tion, their num ber in -
creased sig nif i cantly through out Ukraine, but more than half of re spon -
dents con sid ered them selves as in ca pa ble of in flu enc ing the higher au -
thor i ties. The Cen ter was the only one re gion where the num ber of re -
spon dents ca pa ble of in flu enc ing the government has increased. 
Ta ble 12
The Dy nam ics of Self-ap prais als of the Abil ity to Re sist the De crees of
Gov ern men tal and Lo cal Au thor i ties, %
Self-ap praisal The Cen ter The West The East The South
Ukraine as
a whole
Gov ern ment de crees
1994
Yes  3.0  7.8  7.6  6.0  5.7
No 65.9 65.5 59.1 70.4 65.5
It is hard to say 31.1 26.7 33.2 23.6 28.8
2004
Yes  4.4  8.3  7.0  6.4 6.2
No 70.2 64.6 70.6 69.5 69.1
It is hard to say 25.4 27.1 22.4 24.1 24.7
2005
Yes  9.9 11.4 7.5 9.3  9.5
No 52.8 51.8 63.9 60.4 57.1
It is hard to say 37.3 36.8 28.6 30.3 33.4
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Self-ap praisal The Cen ter The West The East The South
Ukraine as
a whole
De crees of the lo cal au thor i ties
1994
Yes  8.1 14.9 18.4 11.3 12.4
No 58.9 56.8 48.3 60.9 56.8
It is hard to say 33.0 28.3 33.3 27.8 30.8
2004
Yes 13.6 15.4 12.7 12.1 13.3
No 55.6 44.3 58.6 58.4 55.0
It is hard to say 30.9 40.3 28.7 29.5 31.7
2005
Yes 18.3 19.0 13.2 17.8 17.2
No 43.8 41.4 54.5 45.5 46.2
It is hard to say 37.9 39.6 32.3 36.7 36.6
As we can see, the pro por tion of those who think that they can re sist is 
twice as much in the case of de crees of the lo cal au thor i ties. An a lyz ing
the dy nam ics within the past eleven years, we have not re vealed any rad i -
cal changes. Some pos i tive ten den cies were reg is tered in the Cen ter,
while the neg a tive one in the East.
In 1994, the pub lic opin ion poll reg is tered that the larg est pro por tion
of able (at least ver bally) to re sist the de crees of lo cal au thor i ties in fring -
ing peo ple’s rights and in ter ests was in North-East ern and West ern re -
gions. Ten years later, in the for mer, their num ber de creased; while in the
lat ter, it slightly grew. Dif fer ence be tween the West and Ukraine as a
whole was sta tis ti cally sig nif i cant (p < 0.05). 
Be fore rais ing a pro test, one should choose the most ef fec tive and
ac cept able for di rect par tic i pa tion ways and means to as sert one’s
own rights and in ter ests. 
In the poll of 1994, the fol low ing ac tions were con sid ered as un ap -
proved: boy cotts; non-sanc tioned meet ings and dem on stra tions;
strikes; seiz ing build ings and block ing roads; form ing of armed de tach -
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ments. In the poll of 2004, the list was short ened: the last op tion was ex -
cluded as the less prac ti ca ble, but it was again in cluded in the poll of
2005 along with the new one — par tic i pa tion in elec tion cam paigns. 
Fill ing out the ques tion naire, a re spon dent could choose sev eral vari -
ants, but in that case the num ber of those who sup ported these mea -
sures was in cor rect. To cal cu late this in dex pre cisely, we took into ac -
count the only one choice made by re spon dents. 
We would like to dis cuss le gal as pects of a boy cott as a pos si ble form
of so cial pro test. Gen er ally, the boy cott as a re sponse to de crees and ac -
tions of the gov ern men tal and lo cal au thor i ties or man a ge rial em ploy ees
(or their in ac tiv ity), to the court de ci sions, which in fringe peo ple’s rights
and in ter ests, is con sid ered to be non-sanc tioned. At the same time, the
laws cur rently in force ac cept boy cotts as a le git i mate way of pro tect ing
peo ple’s rights and free doms if the gov ern ing bod ies or other sub jects of
le gal re la tion ship in var i ous spheres of ac tiv ity vi o lated them. The mat -
ter con cerns the clause 5 of the Res o lu tion adopted by the Ple nary Ses -
sion of the Su preme Court of Ukraine on the 3rd of De cem ber 1997,
No.13 “On the Court Ex am i na tion of Com plaints about De ci sions, Ac tions
or Ab sence of Ac tions of the Gov ern men tal and Lo cal Au thor i ties”. In the
first poll, 7% of re spon dents choose boy cotts as the most ef fec tive and
ac cept able way for so cial pro test, while in the last poll — only 3%.
We can note the grow ing pop u lar ity of the idea that the most ef fec tive
and ac cept able for per sonal par tic i pa tion ways are col lect ing of sig na -
tures on pe ti tions, as well as law ful meet ings and dem on stra tions. 
It is in ter est ing to see re spon dents’ at ti tude to the un ap proved ac -
tions of so cial pro test af ter the Or ange Rev o lu tion. Ac cord ing to the pre -
sented data, in com par i son to the pre vi ous (i.e. 2004) year, in all re gions,
the num ber of those who were ready to sup port un ap proved pro test ac -
tions has grown. How ever, we have to note that in the East and South, the 
num ber of sup port ers of the un ap proved pro test ac tions was al most the
same as in the first year of L. Kuchma’s pres i dency. The most plau si ble
rea son is that many res i dents were frus trated be cause of de feat of the
pres i den tial con tender whom they had sup ported. In the West and Cen -
ter, most res i dents of which had voted for the win ner of the last pres i den -
tial elec tion in Ukraine, on the con trary, the pro por tion of those who were 
ready to sup port non-sanc tioned forms of pro test has in creased.
At the same time, the most se ri ous drop in num bers of the so cially
pas sive peo ple who do not want par tic i pate per son ally in any of fered
forms of so cial pro test was reg is tered in the Cen ter and West. In the East
and South, the sit u a tion has not changed no tice ably.
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Ta ble 13
The Dy nam ics of Ways, Ac cept able for Per sonal Par tic i pa tion,
to Pro tect One’s Own Rights, %
Ways to pro -
tect one’s own 
rights
The Cen -
ter The West The East The South
Ukraine as 
a whole
Par tic i pa tion in elec tion cam paigns
1994 16.6 15.4 15.9 14.3 15.6
2005 27.0 22.2 24.1 20.3 23.7
Col lec tion of sig na tures on pe ti tions
1994 15.0 20.1 19.9 15.5 17.2
2004 20.5 20.3 22.6 23.8 21.8
2005 23.2 22.2 29.1 24.1 24.6
Law ful meet ings and dem on stra tions
1994 12.8 16.4 20.9 18.2 16.6
2004 19.8 25.2 17.2 16.0 19.2
2005 35.4 37.7 35.3 29.5 34.2
Un ap proved pro test ac tions 
1994  9.2  9.6 13.2 10.4 10.5
2004  6.6  6.8  4.7  3.7  5.4
2005 12.2 12.9  9.0 10.8 11.2
None of the above-men tioned ac tions 
1994 32.3 34.0 29.5 32.7 32.2
2004 32.9 30.5 39.1 43.5 36.7
2005 22.4 19.4 26.9 31.1 25.2
Con clu sions
A va ri ety of eval u a tions as to the his tor i cal past, caused by dif fer ent
socio-cul tural pre con cep tions of his tor i cal events, have a no tice able ef -
fect on com pre hen sion of the cur rent po lit i cal life, po lit i cal ori en ta tion
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and elec toral pref er ences of re gional com mu ni ties. It is worth not ing
here two kinds of re gion al ism. West ern Ukraine, prin ci pally Galychyna,
is an ex am ple of readi ness to sac ri fice the au ton omy to the uni tary na -
tional state. But this does not ap ply to the ex ist ing po lit i cal sys tem. At
the same time, the East and South dem on strate the re gion al ism of self-
 suf fi ciency when the pri mary pur pose is to pro tect in ter ests of ter ri to rial
com mu nity. In con trast to Donbas, the Au ton o mous Re pub lic of Cri mea
does not rep re sent an eco nomic self-suf fi ciency, but rather a so cial, cul -
tural, and ideo log i cal es trange ment. As to the ter ri to rial com mu nity of
the cen tral part of Ukraine, it took an in ter me di ate po si tion be tween the
West and East-South con cern ing the Or ange Rev o lu tion. The ex ist ing
re gional dif fer en ti a tion of po lit i cal ori en ta tions means a cer tain ideo log i -
cal con tra dic tion be tween the West and East-South, though, ac cord ing
to the other in di ca tors of po lit i cal cul ture, the re gions have no ma jor dif -
fer ences. For the last de cade, the dif fer ences in na tional self-iden ti fi ca -
tion be tween the res i dents from Ukrai nian re gions have been evened out. 
More over, the growth in the na tional spa tial-ter ri to rial self-iden ti fi ca tion 
along with de cline in the lo cal one is to be observed.
Since Ukrai ni ans move to the cen trist po lit i cal plat form, the in flu -
ence of ideo log i cal dif fer ences be tween the two op po site seg ments of the
po lit i cal spec trum, the Left and Right, be comes weaker. The prev a lence
of cen trist plat form among the oth ers in all re gions means that, ac cord -
ing to the in dex of ad her ence to cer tain po lit i cal ide ol o gies, po lit i cal iden -
ti ties could not be the dis in te grat ing fac tor of po lit i cal cul ture in the
pres ent-day Ukrai nian so ci ety. We would also like to note that a large
num ber of those, who have not de fined their po lit i cal ori en ta tions or dis -
tanced them selves from any po lit i cal ide ol ogy or move ment, di min ish
the in flu ence of this in di ca tor on the po lit i cal iden tity in re gional com -
mu ni ties. 
Re gional dis tinc tions in de vel op ment of the Ukrai ni ans’ po lit i cal cul -
ture are in con stant, be cause they are in flu enced by such fac tors, as in -
ter ests of re gional elites, con fig u ra tion of the me dia space, po ten tial of
the in for ma tion sources, and cur rent po lit i cal pro cesses. 
The same re gion can man i fest the dif fer ent dy nam ics of the cer tain
in di ca tors of po lit i cal cul ture de pend ing on spe cific time in ter vals. So,
dif fer ences be tween re gions en close not only dis tinc tive fea tures of re -
gions in a cer tain pe riod (static dif fer ences), they are also a re sult of the
dif fer ent intra-re gional dy nam ics as a re sponse of re gional com mu nity
to the changes in so cial and po lit i cal life for the last de cade (dy namic dif -
fer ences). Tak ing into ac count a low trust of re gional com mu ni ties in
118 Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2004–2005
Oleksandr Stegniy
gov ern men tal and lo cal au thor i ties, lack of mass sup port of po lit i cal
lead ers and sep a rat ist move ments, we are en ti tled to the con clu sion that 
there are no suf fi cient “in sti tu tional pre con di tions to make the state or
ter ri to rial com mu nity frag mented” [26, p. 165].
As re gards the re gional elite, it is not in ter ested in de te ri o ra tion of re -
la tions with the cen tral power ei ther, be cause it is un able to com pete
with mighty fi nan cial and in dus trial Rus sian groups and fears to lose
busi ness. In Donbas, the lo cal elite has pri vat ized al most all fi nan cially
at trac tive en ter prises. So, the ter ri to rial in teg rity and sov er eignty of
Ukraine is a nec es sary con di tion to pre serve the cap i tal of the na tional
eco nomic elite ir re spec tive of the place of res i dence. 
An ad verse re ac tion, the Donbas elite’s re sis tance to the cen tral
power, could be caused by Kyiv’s at tempt to re-pri vat ize the large-scale
en ter prises and so to “press down” re gional oli gar chic groups. But this
sce nario is grave; it should be re mem bered that many vot ers from Don -
bas con sider them selves to have lost the pres i den tial elec tion and hope
to win back at the par lia men tary elec tion of 2006. 
Dif fer ences in his tor i cal iden ti ties of re gional com mu ni ties did not af -
fect the in dex of civic con scious ness be ing an ag gre gated in di ca tor of po -
lit i cal in volve ment, ac tiv ity, and po lit i cal ef fi ciency. Ac cord ing to the
pub lic opin ion poll of 2005, in creas ingly ac tive par tic i pa tion in law ful
meet ings and dem on stra tions is mainly a re sult of the mass so cial up -
ris ing dur ing the last pres i den tial elec tion. We can judge whether it is in -
flu enced by sit u a tion or there is a ten dency to wards growth of so cial ac -
tiv ity and self-or ga ni za tion in Ukraine only af ter the par lia men tary elec -
tion of March 2006.
So, thanks to a func tional ap proach taken for our anal y sis, we can
con clude that po lit i cal cul ture of all Ukrai nian re gions tends to the in te -
gra tive-pas sive type with slight dif fer ences, with out re gard to the Or ange 
Rev o lu tion pe riod be ing rather an ex am ple of ex traor di nary so cial and
po lit i cal sit u a tion. 
As to the de vel op ment of po lit i cal cul ture in re gional com mu ni ties,
the fol low ing fact can arouse anx i ety: in all Ukrai nian re gions, but most -
ly in the West, there was reg is tered a no tice able growth of au thor i tar ian
val ues af ter the Or ange Rev o lu tion. So, the po lit i cal elite of the coun try
has to le git i mate the laws cur rently in force; oth er wise it would be im pos -
si ble to de velop the in no va tive-dem o cratic type of the mass po lit i cal cul -
ture and move to wards the sus tain able dem o cratic sys tem, like in West -
ern so ci et ies.
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